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Reviews & Replies

On “Social Media Warriors:
Leveraging a New Battlespace”
Jason W. Warren
This commentary responds to the article by Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek
entitled “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace” published in the Winter
2018–19 issue of Parameters (vol. 48, no. 4).

T

he Army was all but defeated. Concentrated across the Delaware
River from the advancing Redcoats and their mercenary
German allies, General George Washington’s Continental Army
was hemorrhaging personnel after successive defeats during the 1776
campaign. The Army, indeed the entire patriot cause, was in danger of
annihilation and a bloody conclusion to the war if an opportunity had
not presented itself. Information warfare (IWar) provided that strategic
opportunity, altering not only the fate of the Continental Army, but also
the prospects for the new nation.1
The case of 1776 was not unique in the history of IWar as it likely has
been employed in some fashion since man walked the earth in hunting
groups, and certainly since the advent of recorded history in the West,
with both Herodotus and Thucydides describing the use of information
warfare. Today, almost 250 years after the Revolutionary War, IWar
has grabbed center stage again with Russian and Chinese information
warfare campaigns worldwide; it is now vitally important for the United
States to redefine this concept and tie it to a larger strategic framework.
While IWar has always existed, the updated version includes the
combination of modern technologically driven fields such as cyber
operations and electronic warfare. The US Army War College’s Conrad
Crane recently traced the origins and evolution of IWar in the Army,
focusing on its influence on decision making, while demonstrating the
concept is far from novel.2 Yet the IWar concept is the “new” kid on the
block in security circles given shorter-term institutional memories about
victories back in 1776, and there is momentum to enact this concept
with a transitioned US Army Cyber Command to US Army Information
Warfare Command. Lingering concern over Russian interference in US
elections and the continuing Chinese threat over stealing technologies
contributes impetus for this effort. Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara
Matisek, in “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New Battlespace,” call
for new strategies to combat this information operations threat as it
exists on social media platforms.
Absent from Jayamaha and Matisek’s argument, however, is the idea
that the central facet of an adversary’s attempt to undermine democracy

1. David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004),
201–3.
2. Conrad Crane, “The United States Needs an Information Warfare Command: A
Historical Examination,” War on the Rocks, June 14, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/06
/the-united-states-needs-an-information-warfare-command-a-historical-examination/.
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is disinformation, which can be ameliorated by generating a more
compelling narrative. Calls for more government intervention through
the expansion of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 and more efficient
domestic regulations on freedom of speech miss the point that these
too will undermine democracy—and perhaps more so than Russian
bots.3 Plentiful historical examples of IWar undercut the idea that it is a
new concept, while the refocused efforts of the US military to converge
existing information-related fields demonstrate this an issue larger than
political narratives and military decision making alone.
In its vision for transformation, the Army converges and develops
capabilities to identify, defend, and dominate information in the
operational environment to achieve objectives and aid in winning the
nation’s wars. Information warfare would provide national security
leaders meaningful and timely information for decisional advantage
over adversaries.4 It is a critical element in achieving strategic landpower.
Without it, the use of strategic force becomes unmoored from its political
and policy antecedents. IWar bridges the military’s employment of force
from the realm of policy and politics, as Clausewitz described war as the
latter’s continuation by other means. It does so with softer informational
power to influence and persuade relevant actors, while employing harder
power with cyber or electronic warfare through operations in the
information environment and as a means to enhance traditional combat
power in other domains.
IWar provided Washington an asymmetrical opportunity. As British
and Hessian units went into winter quarters local patriots undertook
IWar to discredit the legitimacy of the occupying forces in New York
and New Jersey. This narrative, somewhat accurate but embellished,
portrayed the occupying army as committing depredations against the
local inhabitants. It also highlighted the botched British effort in what
practitioners now consider civil affairs and psychological operations
(types of operations included in the IWar concept), failing to sustain the
narrative of colonial reconciliation with the British Crown.
While Washington did not orchestrate this IWar campaign, his
regular army benefited from the intelligence the campaign generated,
namely that supporting forces had left Hessian General Johann Rall
temporarily isolated at Trenton. IWar ultimately guided and determined
Washington’s successful use of force against a vulnerable adversary. The
Trenton example is the American version of the type of information
warfare the ancient Greeks and Persians, and modern Chinese and
Russians, have used to great effect.
IWar hence creates economies of force in the traditional domains,
establishing a framework to task organize by identifying adversary
vulnerabilities. It allows for an economy of force mission, channeling
military power toward an achievable objective. This economy of force
is especially critical in the case such as Washington’s strategic situation,
where the adversary maintains superiority; there is similarity today with
near-peer adversaries’ advantages in their near abroad for the United
3. Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New
Battlespace” Parameters 48, no. 4 (Winter 2018–9).
4. Author’s personal experience drafting “Information Warfare Transformation” plans and
strategies, during spring 2020 at US Army Cyber Command, US Department of the Army.
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States. The United States and its allies may face local disadvantage,
which the proper employment of IWar could ameliorate.
IWar includes as a critical component an information narrative
that helps commanders to burnish the why of mission accomplishment.
During the Trenton-Princeton winter campaign, the patriot narrative
of harsh British and German treatment ultimately caused the militia to
retake the field and led to the delivery of timely and accurate intelligence
to Washington’s headquarters for operations against Rall. IWar thus
allows for commanders to sense, understand, act, and assess, and allows
combatants to focus on information key terrain to the advantage of their
operations vis á vis the enemy.
IWar consists of more than maneuver forces capitalizing on
advantages and tailoring forces as a result of information narratives
and related intelligence. It also includes electronic warfare and cyber
operations in the information environment, generating effects for the
operational environment. These operations act to disable physically or
logically the command and control capabilities of an adversary or even
the adversary’s materiel itself. Electronic warfare attempts to control
the electromagnetic spectrum, attacking an adversary or impeding his
electronic warfare assaults. Cyber operations proceed along physical,
logical, or persona avenues of approach into a network either to defend
friendly mission-relevant terrain—cyber and/or key terrain—cyber or
hold that of the enemy at risk. Electronic warfare and cyber support
the maneuver force in all military domains through independent
action in the information environment, which reinforces both the
information narrative and the operations, actions, and activities of
other maneuver forces.
By focusing on social media platforms, current IWar literature
misses the critical capabilities of electronic warfare and cyber focused on
more than decision making and actually seeking to disable and destroy
enemy materiel. Armies since the beginning of time have had the
capability to raid headquarters and ambush couriers, thus the targeting
of command and control nodes was still a possibility even without
advanced technology, as well as focusing on information key terrain as
it pertained to their historical contexts. It is worth remembering there
are more traditional means to disrupt command and control—should
an adversary cyberattack in the contemporary environment achieve
transitory superiority on friendly networks.
The key functions embodied in IWar include the existing military
operational specialties of information operations (including military
deception and operational security), as well as psychological and cyber
operations, civil and public affairs, electronic warfare, signals (and
other) intelligence, and space.5 The concept is larger than its individual
components, however, seeking synergy between them and is more
encompassing in its relation to maneuver. It enables strategic landpower
by undergirding the maneuver operational framework which links
tactical operations, actions, and activities to strategic objectives.
Thus IWar incorporates information aspects that shape the friendly
narrative and direct force, but also with inherent capability to act
5. Author’s personal experience drafting “Information War Transformation” plans and
strategies, spring 2020 at US Army Cyber Command, US Department of the Army.
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independently as with electronic warfare and cyber operations inside
the information environment. Friendly forces often employ cyber,
electronic warfare, and information operations to target the decisionmaking ability and cycle of an adversary through disinformation and
damage to systems that provide a conduit for communications and
data. Security and defensive forces also protect the decision-making
capabilities of friendly commanders through mission assurance of data,
information, and communication. Given the interconnectedness of
software, hardware, and information on all military platforms, and as a
shaper and enabler of operations in the operating environment, IWar is
integral to every aspect of warfare.
IWar ultimately assists in achieving strategic objectives by better
focusing operations and lessening risk. Instead of conducting a general
operation to reverse the patriot’s flagging cause, the information
narrative, and the intelligence it generated, provided Washington with
a way to pinpoint Rall’s garrison as a vulnerable target and economize
his own limited capabilities. This directing of maneuver force to an
achievable operational objective, redounded to success at both the
strategy and policy tiers, as the colonials were able to extend the war
effort with successful limited operations. New recruits and reenlistments
were additional policy benefits from Trenton and Princeton as was
confidence from a new information narrative that the colonials could
wage conventional war against a superior enemy.
Whether strategy is defined as the balancing of ends, ways, and
means or the relationship of risk and resources to political goals, IWar
aligns operations to achieve strategic results. Proper employment of
IWar lessened risk in the overall patriot war effort because Washington’s
choice of an exposed garrison reduced danger to the Continentals’
main field army and Congress was better able to align resources in
the dwindling war effort. With the ends, ways, means paradigm, IWar
allowed Washington to fashion his ends of preserving the Army and
the war effort with the ways of the Trenton-Princeton campaign at the
operational level of war, as well as the tactical means of the Continental
Army targeting Rall’s isolated regiments and later the British supply base
at Princeton. IWar hence can establish a framework for strategic results.
IWar interrelates not only to the strategic level of war, but with
all levels of war and indeed every aspect of warfare as part of the
national instruments of power. The information narrative, for instance,
helps to fashion diplomatic overtures that inform actions across the
Competition Continuum. By converging functions and tasks related to
information, IWar harnesses informational power in part for decisionmaking advantage and to limit the decision-making capabilities of
competitors and adversaries. IWar enables economic power, especially
during competition with adversaries, assisting in freedom of navigation
activities and protecting cyber critical infrastructure.
In the military realm, IWar undergirds all the other domains,
acting to direct and focus force utilizing an information narrative (and
supported by other IWar components like cyber operations) against an
objective, whether in space, land, air, sea, or cyberspace. The activities
of nonexclusive military entities, such as the Interagency and civilian
partners, intersect with IWar as well and include the fashioning of
information narratives and supporting operations such as cyber
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defensive of non-DoD networks. Civilian infrastructure supports most
of the military power grid at home and abroad and therefore demands
partnerships for integrated security and defense. The overlap of civilian
infrastructure and military operations creates potential legal pitfalls such
as with Posse Comitatus and legal teams must carefully monitor these.
All of the components of IWar—information, intelligence,
cyber, and electronic warfare operations—compose functions in the
information environment. It is important to note the information
environment is not disparate but intersects with the operational
environment.6 While IWar acts outwardly to direct and tailor maneuver
in the other domains, it also encompasses cyber and electronic warfare
operations in the information environment, which generate their own
objectives and effects. The components of IWar, however, do not orient
toward independent objectives but should be planned as supporting a
larger scheme of operational maneuver or strategic effects at the national
level. Thus IWar is far more than simply dominating media messaging
to influence audiences.
IWar complements the Army’s new multi-domain operations
construct and its concentration on competition below the threshold of
armed conflict, while supporting its operational focus for penetrating
and exploiting near-peer adversary’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities.7
IWar as part of multi-domain operations enables the persistent
engagement of foes by informing both host nation and friendly
populations as to the purposes of friendly operations and shaping the
battlefield in the competition portion of the warfare continuum.
IWar is adversary focused and occurs through persistent engagement
of competitors and adversaries across the Competition Continuum by
ensuring the delivery, reception, assessment, and protection of proactive
messaging. This further develops information resiliency across the force.
In the course of persistent engagement, operations in the information
environment provide commanders at echelon with continuous
identification of key terrain, opportunity, and risk.
Likewise, commands produce feedback to influence future
operations at echelon, providing local, regional, and global input to
operations in the information environment. IWar supports multidomain operations with a calibrated force posture: mission-specific
integrated information formations at echelon; reach-back operations
and intelligence capabilities; and forward deployed IWar teams. With
convergence, commanders will possess information capabilities to
employ in the operational environment. Persistent engagement and
analysis throughout the competition continuum provides commanders
with the ability to posture for conflict.
IWar incorporates psychological operations to shape the perceptions
of targeted audiences and creates effects through military deception
and cyber operations. During high intensity combat, IWar focuses
combat power on the weak links of the enemy’s anti-access/area-denial
capabilities to support a penetration followed by rapid exploitation
6. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, chg. 1 (Washington, DC:
JCS, 2018).
7. US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain
Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Washington, DC: US Army TRADOC, 2018).
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and freedom of maneuver. IWar may identify and disable a portion of
the enemy’s anti-access/area-denial defenses allowing for economy of
force missions, where the enemy has had local superiority of fires and
maneuver elements. IWar allows for the targeting of precise areas in the
enemy defenses that assets from all military domains can penetrate and
exploit, with follow-on forces gaining freedom of maneuver.
Not every corner of the West’s security sector is as enamored of
IWar as some Army cyber operators. Discounting the ability of IWar
operations, actions, and activities to produce casualties, some Israeli
scholars believe the qualification for warfare is predicated on traditional
forms of combat, and hence IWar does not apply in their worldview.8
The US Intelligence Community tends to view IWar-related capabilities
as national-strategic assets meant for extremely targeted and controlled
employment, and only authorized at the highest levels of government.9
The Army’s internal and traditional branch parochialisms also are at play,
as various communities of interest fight to retain siloes of authorities and
power within the institution at the expense of the IWar concept. Various
key players in the Army institutional power structure dislike IWar and
are skeptical of its prospects if applied at echelon to Army formations.10
Then there is the problem of scale and scope in defining the battlefield.
The government network—the DoD Information Network—is so large,
it has proven impossible to defend.11 This is just the defensive portion
of cyber operations, not accounting for the complexity of offense in the
cyber domain. The IWar concept will expand the scope of operations
even further by accounting for all of the other information-related
capabilities and their functions.
This idea of scope and scale in this new battlespace for IWar seems
lost on many observers as a recent Strateg y Bridge article demonstrated.12
There will have to be a reckoning between the desired functionality of
IWar and the budgeting of scarce resources (exacerbated by political
combat between branch interests), the aversion to new command and
control structures like headquarters, and the very size of this new
enterprise. Even with these concerns, the fact the nation is at risk from
foreign adversaries, who have meddled in US national political discourse
and launched cyberattacks of all kinds, while vying for an asymmetrical
advantage, will be enough to push IWar development into operation.
From the earliest times, the functions of IWar and resulting
economies of force, regardless of technical capabilities over the
intervening years, have acted as a guiding light for forces to achieve
objectives. Whether in Washington’s time with the information narrative
of British and German despoliations that generated intelligence for
the Trenton-Princeton campaign, or in fashioning a counternarrative
8. Email exchanges with author after a conference at St. Andrews, Scotland, April–May 2016.
9. Author’s experience as Future Plans Chief, Joint Force Headquarters, DoD Information
Network.
10. Author’s experience as lead planner for US Army Cyber Command for transformation to
Information Warfare Command effort. (As of summer 2020, the effort has been placed on hold.)
11. Author’s experience as Future Plans Chief Joint Force Headquarters, DoD Information
Network.
12. Jeff Edmonds and Samuel Bendett, “Russian Battlefield Awareness and Information
Dominance: Improved Capabilities and Future Challenges,” Strategy Bridge, February 26, 2019,
https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2019/2/26/russian-battlefield-awareness-and
-information-dominance-improved-capabilities-and-future-challenges.
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for Russian incursions into Eastern Europe, IWar serves as a basis for
operations in all domains.
Although social media messaging and IWar effects on decision
making are important, these do not represent the totality of these
converged capabilities. During competition, IWar combines with ways
and means enacted in other domains to deter potential adversaries and
prevent conflict. With the outbreak of conflict, IWar operations actions
and activities in the information environment create effects used by
maneuver forces to penetrate, exploit, and regain freedom of maneuver
during multi-domain operations. IWar then refocuses for the recompete
stage of the competition continuum to consolidate gains and prevent
future policy discord. IWar is nothing short of a crucial part of warfare
spanning military history and is especially critical for the informationdominated battlefields of the twenty-first century.

The Authors Reply
Buddhika B. Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek

A

fundamental axiom that the nature of war remains the
same while the character of war keeps evolving overtime is
increasingly under scrutiny. For several millennia, land and sea
were the domains in which the fortunes of armies were decided. We
know industrialization transformed the way wars were fought in World
War I and World War II and further advances such as nuclear weapons
altered the way wars were waged in various battlespaces throughout the
Cold War. In this context, scholars such as Weigley in 1973 believed the
American way of war—predicated on combined arms maneuver and
a preponderance of force—was becoming antiquated.13 Admiral J. C.
Wylie wrote in 1967 about a new vision for effective military strategy,
specifically that all military tools and domains should be used to support
landpower in pursuit of control.14 Weigley and Wylie were correct in
identifying an emerging problem, but their paradigms were still predicated
on land as the defining domain of warfare.
America and its allies are returning to an era of Great Power
competition, as expressed in all national security documents from the
current administration. Space is identified as an autonomous domain
of warfare, requiring us to imagine what constitutes space power and
what role the new US Space Force should play in defending American
vulnerabilities. Still, while autonomous, space is just as intertwined
with the day-to-day realities and joint warfighting principles as the
other domains.
But the advent of cyber is something fundamentally different from
the military domains of land, sea, air, and space, specifically owing to

13. Russel F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and
Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973).
14. J. C. Wylie, Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers
University Press, 1967).
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cyberspace’s intangibility and the inability to apply to it Clausewitzian
ideas of mass and maneuver in a conventional sense. Thus, scholars and
practitioners face conceptual and analytical challenges in attempting
to analyze cyber domain threats, especially in terms of whether this
domain has changed the nature and/or character of warfare. In many
ways, Dr. Jason Warren’s thoughts about information warfare (IWar)
are on point, aligning closely with the conventional warfare thoughts
espoused by Weigley and Wylie. Warren’s conception of IWar is wedded
to supporting strategic landpower where information plays an auxiliary
shaping function and kinetic missions—the main effort—are expected
to generate the desired end state.
He is correct that the United States constantly utilizes information
warfare in overall campaign plans—from 1775 to Operation Inherent
Resolve. The challenge we identified is the way civil society is organized
and functions in liberal democracies. The unique nature of cyber as
its own domain and the sinews connecting people in that domain
make both cyber and civil society undefended attack surfaces state and
nonstate adversaries could leverage into new battlespaces effectively
with very little cost, in comparison to elaborate Cold War information
warfare campaigns.
Though we are far from it, America’s adversaries are increasingly
realizing if things we take for granted can be weaponized by hijacking
them—voluntary surveillance equipment that tracks movement,
heartbeats, vehicles we drive, televisions, thermostats, and anything
with the prefix “smart.” Of course, “smart electronic device” is merely
a euphemism—it is linked to a third party and can be hijacked by an
unauthorized third party. This is the really terrifying part—where reality
can be warped. It just might be landpower, which used to be the main
effort, may end up playing an auxiliary role to the main thrust of military
power—cyber weapons and information-political warfare.

Civil Society and Cyberspace: Distilling into a New Battlespace

Cyber domain in its totality consists of the sinews connecting the
warfighters, machines, widgets, societies, economies, governments, and
people. These sinews have created a humanly devised domain integral to
everything we do, just as it remains its own autonomous domain. While
people are an important element of any domain of warfare, the shift
of the battlespace to civil society is an existential threat due to the fact
that cyberspace is increasingly embedded within the constructs of civil
society, informing what reality is and how reality is socially constructed
and interpreted. Influencing a civil society—people—is always part
of any military campaign, as is targeting the government and army,
encapsulating Clausewitz’s trinity.15 Influencing civil society involves
efforts to alter people’s behaviors with the use (or threat) of violence,
or with the use of disinformation campaigns, prior to, during, or after a
military campaign.
There is a conceptual disconnect in Warren’s view that current
campaigns by state, state-affiliated proxies, and nonstate actors
to sow discord in civil societies are nothing more than old-school
15. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989 [1832]).
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disinformation campaigns which can be ameliorated with more
compelling counternarratives. Yes, the Soviet Union, China, and
other adversaries actively executed disinformation campaigns against
the United States and her allies during the Cold War. The world of
information warfare Warren describes, however, pertains to a preInternet era where the traditional means of waging a dis/misinformation
campaign were qualitatively different. Those Cold War-era campaigns
were broad based and ideational (with multiple barriers to entry and high
risk) as opposed to the targeted, individualized attacks made possible
with today’s technology. As a result, information-political operations
were part of elaborate covert campaigns.
The emergence of the cyber domain and its real-time fidelity and
linkages to what we perceive as reality in terms of daily interactions, be
it with humans, news, social media, bots, foreign actors with malicious
intent, etc., fundamentally changes Warren’s notions of IWar on multiple
levels. Social media warriors can inflict damage by relying on the power
of social movements to either create or fuel new and radical politically
aware groups in civil society that polarize and/or create new policy
outcomes undermining state power. This influence of social media
warriors over social movements has tremendous implications for liberal
democracies worldwide due to the great asymmetry in power between
them and their authoritarian and illiberal adversaries.

Cognitive Hacking: Weaponizing Reality

The AK-47 democratized violence and became the great equalizer
during the myriad civil wars that proliferated in the twentieth century,
allowing the weak to fight with some degree of comparable firepower.
The cyber domain is similar in its low barriers to entry requiring
only a rudimentary knowledge of networks and code, making it the
AK-47 of the twenty-first century. Cyber versions of this weapon are
affordable, portable, can be hidden in plain sight, and are deployable
from an unsuspecting table in a peaceful café with Wi-Fi. The greatest
differences, however, are the intensity, precision, and capabilities
afforded in targeting and attacking, at low cost and little to no risk.
Taking up physical arms against the state in the pre-Internet era was a
high-risk activity with minimal payoffs; the cyber era has flipped this
calculus upside down.
Cyber power in the hands of many, buttressed by state power, has
only further democratized the ability of adversarial states and nonstate
actors to wage political-information warfare in civil societies ostensibly
not at war. Today, foreign adversaries can reach out and touch an
individual in any number of platforms with targeted information, based
on easy, unclassified data collection techniques that resonate with the
subject’s inherent cognitive biases in ways previously unimagined. This
targeting, combined with big data and increasing levels of knowledge
about human behavior and other elements of social science, has brought
an unfathomable level of scale to information warfare.
Individual decisions are shaped by the context of information; when
a hostile actor can control this context (made very specific and limited
by the way we are connected) generating a cognitive hack, the result
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is reinforcing ideational “echo chambers.”16 Such echo chambers pass
the threshold of the imaginary and become real when individuals make
decisions in terms of it.
The advent of artificial intelligence, blockchain and bitcoin
technologies, quantum computing, and deepfakes, while still in their
adolescence, will only further amplify the weaponization of cyberspace
and targeting of civil society and individuals. These actions could deepen
existing social cleavages or generate new ones where none may have
existed, providing America’s adversaries multiple points of entry and
empowering the “Social Media Warriors” we described in our original
Parameters article to wreak havoc on civil society through the process
of schismogenesis.17 Meanwhile China, as the quintessential example of
an authoritarian adversary, can gerrymander their population through
social credit scores, with heightened surveillance technologies ensuring
any belief, idea, or value that does not fit the company line of the dear
glorious Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is locked away deep in the
cerebellum of Chinese citizens (for the short term at least!).
These CCP activities also highlight the asymmetry between liberal
democracies and authoritarian regimes in their abilities to inoculate
their respective societies. By exploiting the freedoms espoused in liberal
democracies that give rise to vibrant civil societies, adversaries can gain
access to those societies and use information platforms to exploit societal
cleavages. Authoritarian regimes such as China socially engineer their
citizens, finding innumerable ways to “sanitize” corruptive Western
thought. By generating the narrative that Western ideals are dangerous,
the CCP creates an information echo chamber for over a billion people.
The dear CCP official can screen all movies, music, art, poetry,
history books, and any other form of information and entertainment.
All of these actions of course seem abhorrent and over-controlling to
those in the West. Yet the Chinese Communist Party can easily and
transparently advise their citizenry that they block some Western
content because it perverts Chinese values and could cause chaos, which
would hurt Chinese prosperity. This relatively explicit social contract
by the CCP appears readily accepted except in Hong Kong, precisely
because Hong Kong natives are only now becoming exposed to Chinese
censorship. The demonstrations are a reaction to the enforcement of the
new CCP normal.
And while a Chinese citizen cannot use the social media platform
Twitter, Chinese-based TikTok has access to American citizens,
providing them biased reporting of protests in Hong Kong. In other
words, the unit of analysis is the civil society at home. We cannot limit
our liberties to counter our adversaries—this would mean handing
our adversaries an inadvertent victory. We cannot, as Warren suggests,
counter the weaponization of civil society in liberal democracies with
more compelling counternarratives.

16. Elanor Colleoni, Alessandro Rozza, and Adam Arvidsson, “Echo Chamber or Public
Sphere? Predicting Political Orientation and Measuring Political Homophily in Twitter Using Big
Data,” Journal of Communication 64, no. 2 (2014): 317–32.
17. Buddhika Jayamaha and Jahara Matisek, “Social Media Warriors: Leveraging a New
Battlespace,” Parameters 48, no. 4 (Winter 2018–19): 11–24.
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Governments and state authorities in liberal democracies are not in
the business of waging information operations in their own societies no
matter how well intentioned. This is precisely what authoritarian regimes
do, with China being the exceptional example. And counternarratives
have additional dangers. As Benedict Anderson noted, the ability of a
state and nation to construct an “Imagined Community” creates the
most cross-cleavage unity and alliances across elites in support of the
desired nation-state identity.18 China and Russia have increasingly put
a stranglehold on the free exchange of ideas in order to ensure their
imagined community fits the worldview of their political leadership.
Simultaneously they are attempting to fracture overarching national
identities in the United States and across Europe, precisely because
it is easier to do in liberal democracies with myriad crisscrossing and
crosscutting social cleavages.

Conclusion

The more salient puzzle of Warren’s concerns about the 1878
Posse Comitatus Act requires significant reflection on what actually
made America so great to begin with. We cannot allow our security
and intelligence agencies to wage information operations on home soil.
Our only contention, however, is such policing of the cyber domain
and defending against foreign social media warriors should include
new levels of engagement by national security institutions to protect
against subversion and other acts attempting to sow panic and/or
undermine security.
As emerging data are already showing, the COVID-19 pandemic
has given China and Russia yet another entry point to sow confusion
and fear in Western civil society, such as their attempts at advertising
how much better their countries are handling the crisis. This enables
them to push anti-Western news and narratives on unsuspecting and
concerned social media users in the West. These users, in turn, share
the misleading information, conspiracies, and memes, only contributing
more to the crisis and shortages, like the “Great Toilet Paper Panic of
2020.” Moreover, we contend there is tremendous information-political
warfare value in referring to COVID-19 as the Chinese flu, as the
Trump administration is attempting to do, precisely because it ups the
counternarrative ante on China.
Finally, we do agree with Warren’s broader point that what is
required is a more compelling counternarrative but one aimed at our
adversaries—again—as we used to do and were exceptionally effective
in doing during the Cold War. Alas, that required a consensus among
national security and political elites on the nature of the threat and the
desired effects such a campaign was meant to generate—people who
espouse liberal democratic ideals, buttressed by a faith in free markets.
Unfortunately, such a consensus is far removed at a time when a vocal
minority question both liberal democracy and capitalism. Perhaps such
growing skepticism is partially a function of the effective weaponization
of civil society as a new battlespace.

18. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism
(New York: Verso, 2006 [1983]).
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All we know is from Pearl Harbor to 9/11, threats to the United
States have brought Americans together across the political spectrum
for consensus, making the country more powerful and unified in policy
decisions. But if we correctly assume the Chinese and Russians (and
others) have studied the social processes of what makes America great,
then they have every reason to invest in schismogenesis attacks against
civil society, ensuring a divided and polarized America once the dust
settles from the current Chinese flu pandemic and basic scientific facts
pertaining to wearing a mask.

